Reino Unido - The Guardian
Russia flexes its military muscle
05/01/2009
A draft document on Russia's security strategy suggests it is geared up for the possibility of conflict over energy resources
As Russia once again resorts to aggressive economic tactics in its latest dispute over gas supplies with neighbouring Ukraine, its official state documentation is raising the spectre of future military conflict over energy resources. Russia's security council prepared a draft document on national security strategy until 2020. At a joint security council and state council meeting held in Moscow on 25 December and chaired by Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, the document in question was to be discussed, but this was postponed at the last minute, instead concentrating on Russian policy in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
President Medvedev ordered a new security strategy in June 2008, and its draft form has been discussed among all its regions. The "strategy of national security of the Russian Federation until the year 2020" – written under the direction of Nikolay Patrushev, secretary of the security council, is expected to be adopted at a state council meeting on 20 February 2009. In early December 2008 Patrushev toured Russia's federal districts promoting the new security strategy. Following a meeting on national security in the far eastern city of Blagoveshchensk he said the proposed draft was pragmatic and practical, and lists specific measures to ensure Russia's national security.
The document itself begins with the claim that Russia has overcome the "consequences of the systemic political and socioeconomic crisis of the late 20th century" and has now restored its capacity to promote its national interest through "multipolar international relations". After predictably designating the United States as Russia's main rival, it then turns to how Russia may maintain its position in the world in future and describes rivalry for controlling global energy resources as a longer term source of conflict. The regions where such confrontations are expected to sharpen is also defined: "The international policy will focus on the access to the energy sources of the world, including the Middle East, Barents Sea, the Arctic Region, Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The struggle for the hydrocarbon resources can be developed to the military confrontation as well, which can result with violation of balance on the Russia's borders with the allies and increasing of the nuclear countries". It also suggests existing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Middle East, some of the South Asian and African countries, as well as in Korean peninsula will have a continued negative impact on the international situation over the next 12 years.
Emphasising possible future Nato enlargement, the new strategy promises to resist US plans to develop its missile defence capabilities, which the Russian elite claims are being aimed against Russia, rather than North Korea or Iran. Furthermore, Russia will pursue a "pragmatic foreign policy" which eschews a new arms race, which clearly the country cannot afford in any case.
Despite widespread disagreement among Russian academics and security experts, the document assumes the possibility of future military conflict erupting over energy resources. Its current gas dispute with Ukraine compelled the Russian government to downplay fears within the EU of any possible disruption to energy supplies, has triggered speculation of increased gas prices in the UK and recently disclosed British government documents confirm that during the last Russo-Ukrainian energy dispute in 2006 the UK energy minister Alan Johnson was briefed eight times on threats to energy security emanating from Russia.
Russia's pursuit of the "multipolar world order" will involve support from its allies in the CIS and its partners elsewhere. It pledges deeper participation within the G8, G20, RIC (Russia, India, China) and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Although referring positively to its allies within the collective security treaty organisation, there is no doubt that drawing on the lessons of its experience of the Georgia war last August, Russia will rely more on its own devices and especially its armed forces, which are promised financial and other resources "sufficient" for the creation of a new image of the armed forces while retaining its strategic nuclear potential. The strategy also calls for establishing a "highly professional community of Russian secret services" as a means of ensuring the external and internal security of Russia and developing a "national framework of dealing with international terrorism, extremism, nationalism, and ethnic separatism". All this implies that Russia will continue to use its intelligence services at home and abroad to exaggerate Russia's power and its image in the world.
Almost bombastic in its tone, once again portraying an "image" of a resurgent Russia, the new security strategy neglects real risks stemming from falling production and social hardship – these are not risks based on an imaginary enemy attacking Russia for its energy resources. The price of oil has fallen sharply, the world's economy is slowing down and the financial crisis is hitting Russia hard: the country's political leadership must adjust to new harsh economic realities, but instead chooses to flex military "muscle".
As Russia once again resorts to aggressive economic tactics in its latest dispute over gas supplies with neighbouring Ukraine, its official state documentation is raising the spectre of future military conflict over energy resources. Russia's security council prepared a draft document on national security strategy until 2020. At a joint security council and state council meeting held in Moscow on 25 December and chaired by Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev, the document in question was to be discussed, but this was postponed at the last minute, instead concentrating on Russian policy in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
President Medvedev ordered a new security strategy in June 2008, and its draft form has been discussed among all its regions. The "strategy of national security of the Russian Federation until the year 2020" – written under the direction of Nikolay Patrushev, secretary of the security council, is expected to be adopted at a state council meeting on 20 February 2009. In early December 2008 Patrushev toured Russia's federal districts promoting the new security strategy. Following a meeting on national security in the far eastern city of Blagoveshchensk he said the proposed draft was pragmatic and practical, and lists specific measures to ensure Russia's national security.
The document itself begins with the claim that Russia has overcome the "consequences of the systemic political and socioeconomic crisis of the late 20th century" and has now restored its capacity to promote its national interest through "multipolar international relations". After predictably designating the United States as Russia's main rival, it then turns to how Russia may maintain its position in the world in future and describes rivalry for controlling global energy resources as a longer term source of conflict. The regions where such confrontations are expected to sharpen is also defined: "The international policy will focus on the access to the energy sources of the world, including the Middle East, Barents Sea, the Arctic Region, Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The struggle for the hydrocarbon resources can be developed to the military confrontation as well, which can result with violation of balance on the Russia's borders with the allies and increasing of the nuclear countries". It also suggests existing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Middle East, some of the South Asian and African countries, as well as in Korean peninsula will have a continued negative impact on the international situation over the next 12 years.
Emphasising possible future Nato enlargement, the new strategy promises to resist US plans to develop its missile defence capabilities, which the Russian elite claims are being aimed against Russia, rather than North Korea or Iran. Furthermore, Russia will pursue a "pragmatic foreign policy" which eschews a new arms race, which clearly the country cannot afford in any case.
Despite widespread disagreement among Russian academics and security experts, the document assumes the possibility of future military conflict erupting over energy resources. Its current gas dispute with Ukraine compelled the Russian government to downplay fears within the EU of any possible disruption to energy supplies, has triggered speculation of increased gas prices in the UK and recently disclosed British government documents confirm that during the last Russo-Ukrainian energy dispute in 2006 the UK energy minister Alan Johnson was briefed eight times on threats to energy security emanating from Russia.
Russia's pursuit of the "multipolar world order" will involve support from its allies in the CIS and its partners elsewhere. It pledges deeper participation within the G8, G20, RIC (Russia, India, China) and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Although referring positively to its allies within the collective security treaty organisation, there is no doubt that drawing on the lessons of its experience of the Georgia war last August, Russia will rely more on its own devices and especially its armed forces, which are promised financial and other resources "sufficient" for the creation of a new image of the armed forces while retaining its strategic nuclear potential. The strategy also calls for establishing a "highly professional community of Russian secret services" as a means of ensuring the external and internal security of Russia and developing a "national framework of dealing with international terrorism, extremism, nationalism, and ethnic separatism". All this implies that Russia will continue to use its intelligence services at home and abroad to exaggerate Russia's power and its image in the world.
Almost bombastic in its tone, once again portraying an "image" of a resurgent Russia, the new security strategy neglects real risks stemming from falling production and social hardship – these are not risks based on an imaginary enemy attacking Russia for its energy resources. The price of oil has fallen sharply, the world's economy is slowing down and the financial crisis is hitting Russia hard: the country's political leadership must adjust to new harsh economic realities, but instead chooses to flex military "muscle".
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